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Chapter 1: Introduction, Definitions and Clarifications, and Preview of Key Issues 
 
Introduction 
The United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling on Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, 558 US (2010) (hereafter to be referred to as “Citizens”) has been one of the most 
controversial decisions in the history of the Court. This reversal of the appellate court decision, 
which was issued on January 21, 2010, has provoked an almost unparalleled level of unrest in 
both the public and political sphere.  At its core, Citizens is essentially a case about the 
interpretation of the First Amendment; therefore it may not be surprising to understand the level 
of the public’s interest in this influential decision.  Citizens is of such noteworthy importance that 
President Obama directly referred to the case, albeit in a disparaging manner, in his State of the 
Union Address of 2010.1  In addition to engaging with contentious issues of free speech, the 
Citizens ruling also covers a plethora of similarly controversial themes, such as the evolving 
status of corporations under the law, the threat of foreign companies influencing politics via 
United States-based subsidiary companies, and the possibility of freedom of expression and 
speech being restricted in other forms of communication.  The potential impact that the Citizens 
decision could have on the citizens, and corporations in America is astounding.  Therefore a 
thorough investigation of this case is well warranted.  This paper will first provide a brief 
explanation of the basic facts and clarify a few of the important concepts that will be imperative 
to understanding this case; second, this analysis will examine the most critical arguments in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Andrew Malcolm, "Obama's State of the Union Address: Criticism of the Supreme Court 
Campaign Finance Ruling," Top of the Ticket | Sunday Shows: Cantor, Plouffe, Trump, Blair, 
Ryan | Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2010, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2010/01/obamas-state-of-the-union-address-
criticism-of-the-supreme-court-campaign-finance-ruling.html. 
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Citizens as they are presented from both the concurring majority opinions and the dissenting 
opinions, in the effort to determine which side (if either) presents the more compelling case; and 
finally, this paper will explore a few of the potential consequences that could occur in the post-
Citizens world.  The goal of the following detailed analysis is not only to dissect and analyze the 
arguments from both sides of the bench, but also to determine whether the Court has aligned 
with precedent and its mandate in passing Citizens.  
 
Ruling, Definitions and Clarifications 
Before delving too deeply into the constitutionality of this fascinating case, a few basic 
facts about the case and clarifications of terminology would be helpful.  Of primary importance 
is a description of the circumstances surrounding the original case that Citizens United 
eventually presented to the Supreme Court, to be followed by an elucidation of the changes to 
previous legislation that this case evoked, and a clarification of the most centrally relevant 
concepts.  Finally, this section will conclude with a brief investigation as to whether banning a 
party from financially contributing to a campaign is tantamount to a violation of that party’s First 
Amendment protections.  
Citizens United is a non-profit, conservative corporation that sought to air a documentary, 
entitled Hillary: The Movie.2  Citizens United used both movie theaters and “on demand” 
functions on television as a means of distributing this documentary, which qualified its method 
of dissemination as “public distribution.” This documentary was a 30-minute film that portrayed 
Senator Hillary Clinton in a negative manner.  It should also be noted that the film was available 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 US ___ (2010) (Kennedy, A., opinion, 2). 
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“on demand” within 30 days of the primary election that Clinton was to participate in.3 Hillary 
was deemed to be an electioneering communication, which means that the film was interpreted 
as having no other purpose than to persuade voters to vote against Clinton.  Because the film was 
“publicly distributed” within 30 days of a primary election and was considered to be an 
“electioneering communication” that was financed from the general treasury of a corporation, 
Citizens United was found to be in violation of § 441b of the Bi-Partisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA).4  These are the main issues that the Supreme Court was considering when the Citizens 
case first appeared on the docket, and many of these fundamental concepts will be discussed in 
greater detail in later chapters.  However, in an atypical gesture for the nine justices, the Court 
requested that both parties return with re-argumentation that integrated a far broader scope of 
arguments; 22 amicus briefs were filed after the Court requested to hear new arguments.5  More 
details will follow in Chapter 3 about judicial activism and stare decisis, but it is important for 
this initial analysis to be mindful of the fact that these were the original issues in the Citizens 
case.   
Citizens United was found to be in violation of § 441b of BCRA, which sought to codify 
and update campaign finance reform. Also known as the McCain-Feingold Act, this piece of 
legislation considerably restricted the rights of corporations to contribute to political campaigns.6  
While BCRA, and the essential Supreme Court case Austin v. Michigan will be described and 
contextualized in much greater detail later, it is useful to first understand the law for corporations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Citizens United v. FEC (Kennedy, A., opinion, 2). 
4 Citizens United v. FEC (Kennedy, A., opinion, 52). 
5 "Brennan Center Files Amicus in Citizens United Case," Brennan Center for Justice, July 31, 
2009, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/brennan_center_files_amicus_in_citizens_united
_case/. 
6 Citizens United v. FEC (syllabus, 1). 
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in the pre-Citizens status quo. As mentioned above, BCRA banned any electioneering 
communications that was publicly distributed within either 30 days of a primary election or 60 
days of a general election.   
One of the most popular criticisms of the types of limitations that BCRA necessitated 
cites an example where the Sierra Club, an advocacy group for environmentalism, could not air a 
commercial if one frame of that commercial contained an explicit message for voters to vote 
against a candidate that supports deforestation or a similarly destructive policy. 7   This 
advertisement would be deemed an electioneering communication, and, moreover, since the 
Sierra Club is a corporation, the advertisement would be paid for out of the Sierra Club’s general 
treasury fund.8  However, after the 1976 case Buckley v. Valeo, corporations were no longer able 
to finance electioneering communications from their general treasury funds, but instead were 
required to develop a Political Action Committee (PAC), and delegate the PAC to fund 
expenditures within the given limits.9  While Buckley strengthened the restrictions for indirect 
contributions by corporations, it simultaneously lifted the ban on individual expenditures.  
Buckley built upon the first legislation with regard to campaign finance reform: the Tillman Act.  
The Tillman Act of 1907, in which all corporate, direct contributions were banned, provided a 
basic, yet vague, set of restrictions on campaign financing.10   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Citizens United v. FEC (Kennedy, A., opinion, 20). 
8 "House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties, Committee on the Judiciary," in Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, 
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 
One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session: First Amendment and Campaign Finance 
Reform After Citizens United, Serial No. 111-71 (February 3, 2010), Sensenbrenner, F. James, 3. 
9 Citizens United v. FEC (Kennedy, A., opinion, 21). 
10 Citizens United v. FEC (Stevens, J., dissent, 42). 
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Accordingly, Buckley, and a few other key cases and acts, sought to clarify the principles 
that the Tillman Act laid out.11  Specifically, Buckley defined the difference between a 
“contribution” (donations directly to candidates and to political committees, that are then used by 
the candidate or campaign as needed) and an “expenditure” (money spent not in official 
conjunction with a candidate or a party, but independently on the candidate’s behalf, where the 
person making the expenditure retains the right to spend the expenditure as he sees fit).12  
Another two terms that coincide with contributions and expenditures are “direct” and “indirect.” 
For the purposes of this paper, “direct” will be associated with contributions, and “indirect” will 
be associated with expenditures.  The term “expenditure” will also be synonymous with 
“spending,” as the Court and literature on the subject have made no differentiation between the 
two terms.  For example, direct contribution limits have been maintained through Buckley, 
Austin, and Citizens while independent expenditure limits have changed over time.  This 
differentiation in terminology is key to Citizens because the ruling lifted the ban on expenditures, 
but retained the restrictions for contributions.  More information on the history of legislation 
regarding these two concepts will follow in Chapter 2.   
There are a few additional clarifications of terms and key facts that will help to crystallize 
the case.  First, the opinion of the Court frequently refers to the conflict between “pre-Austin” 
and “post-Austin” delineation.13 This refers to the Court’s stance before the 1991 Court case 
Austin v. Michigan where the restriction on speech is forbidden based on a speaker’s identity.14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The following definitions and clarifications use the same language that the Supreme Court has 
used in written opinions and dissents, specifically in Citizens and Buckley. 
12 "Questions from Senator Hatch and Responses from Professor Smith," in Hearing before the 
Committe on the Judiciary United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second 
Session, Serial No. J-111-79 (March 10, 2010), Professor Smith, 73. 
13 Citizens United v. FEC (Kennedy, A., opinion, 39). 
14 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652, (1990).  
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There will be a much more detailed analysis in Chapter 2, on the constitutional history of 
campaign finance reform, but the core issue is that the post-Austin ruling allowed for a 
consideration of the speaker’s identity in determining his right to unrestricted speech.  This 
distinction between the pre-Austin and post-Austin lines of precedent will be crucial for 
determining the validity of banning freedom of speech based on identity.  
The differentiation between “as-applied” and “facial” challenges is also crucial in 
obtaining an understanding of the evolution of the arguments in this case.  Traditionally, an “as-
applied” challenge refers to an instance where the law may normally be constitutional, but due to 
a particular set of circumstances is unconstitutional in the specific case.15  A “facial” challenge 
contests the constitutionality of a law in every circumstance.16  The original challenge filed by 
Citizens United was a facial one against BCRA § 441b.17  However, as the case began to evolve 
(which Chapter 3 will detail), Citizens United dropped the facial challenge in favor of an as-
applied one, although the decision rendered by the Court was delivered on facial grounds.18  The 
Court originally was expected to deliver a decision in June 2009. However, in a move that 
surprised many onlookers, the Court instead asked both Citizens United and the Federal Election 
Commission to prepare updated briefs.  When these 22 briefs were delivered, the Court began 
deliberating as if a facial challenge, rather than an as-applied challenge, was issued.19  The 
switch from an as-applied challenge to a facial challenge is one of the many interesting aspects 
of the Citizens case.  In this scenario, however, interesting leads to controversial, as opponents of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 "Challenge: Legal Definition," Legal Definitions, http://law.yourdictionary.com/challenge. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Citizens United v. FEC (Stevens, J., opinion, 4). 
18 Ibid. 
19 "Brennan Center Files Amicus in Citizens United Case." 
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the majority opinion question the legitimacy of the Court’s ability to ask for updated briefs and 
change the discussed material to include a re-evaluation of the prominent Austin case. 
In order to simplify points of reference later, the following is a breakdown of how each 
Justice voted on this case to achieve the 5-4 decision.  Siding with the majority opinion: Chief 
Justice John Roberts, Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Anthony Kennedy, Justice Clarence 
Thomas, and Justice Samuel Alito.  For the dissenting opinion: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, 
Justice Stephen Breyer, Justice John Paul Stevens, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor.20  Justice 
Kennedy authored the majority opinion while Justice Stevens wrote the most thorough dissenting 
opinion.  The majority and dissenting opinions closely aligned with traditional party lines, where 
the majority Justices are Republicans and the dissenting Justices are Democrats.  Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor retired immediately before this case was heard; scholars, such as Rick Hasen, 
question if the vote would have been the same had O’Connor had not been replaced with Justice 
Alito.  Although O’Connor was a Republican, she was considered to be a moderate, and may 
have voted against Citizens.21   
 
Preview of Key Issues 
Citizens presupposes the connection that barring an entity, be it a physical person or an 
artificially created corporation, from spending money in the political process constitutes a 
violation of free speech.  There is such a focus on the controversy of the decision of the Court 
that this assumption is often taken for granted.  However, before further engaging with this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Citizens United v. FEC 
21 Rick Hasen, "Beyond Citizens United: Campaign Finance Law and the Roberts Court" 
(lecture, Athenaeum, Claremont, April 1, 2011). 
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fascinating moment in Constitutional history, it would be prudent to first examine whether 
spending money represents an expression of freedom of speech. 
Perhaps the main reason that the official decision from the Court includes the missing 
link between expenditures and freedom of speech may be that the Buckley Court of 1976 already 
made this link.  As was discussed above, recall that the Buckley Court created the initial 
legislation on the differentiation between expenditures and contributions, where expenditures are 
the focus of the Citizens case.  Buckley determined that expenditures are considered speech and 
contributions are merely considered associations, therefore it is unconstitutional to set limitations 
on expenditures.22 
Based on the precedent of the Supreme Court, spending money on campaigns is 
considered to be a form of free speech. With that crucial link established, this analysis can 
continue to examine the validity of the individual issues that surfaced during the Citizens case.  
The following chapters are crafted with the intent of either providing appropriate context or 
analysis that will ultimately help in achieving this paper’s main goal: to determine if the Court 
made the correct ruling in Citizens.  Through this analysis, this paper eventually comes to the 
conclusions that, when factoring in the relative weight of technical court concepts (stare decisis, 
judicial activism and judicial restraint), key issues in the present, and threats for the future, the 
Supreme Court was incorrect in its decision to overrule the appellate court decision on Citizens.  
While this paper is quite reluctant to rely on statistical data, one statistic may be relevant for 
framing the reader’s mind before this discussion continues.   A recent Washington Post-ABC 
News poll reported that 80% of Americans disagree with the Supreme Court’s decision to lift the 
ban on corporate spending, with 85% of Democrats, 76% of Republicans, and 81% of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Daniel Polsby, "Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech," The Supreme 
Court Review 1976 (1976): 21. 
11	  
Independents voicing disapproving opinions of the Court.23  Additionally, in President Obama’s 
most recent State of the Union Address, he elucidated his disagreement with the decision when 
he said that the Supreme Court had, “Reversed a century of law to open the floodgates – 
including foreign corporations – to spend without limit in our elections.”24  
Before beginning the actual analysis of this case, it is important to establish the 
significance of what follows.  In addition to the dissent’s fear of threats to democracy and the 
potential banning of books, there is something more fundamental at stake with this decision: 
freedom of speech and all that it entails.  As the official Court syllabus mentions, there must be 
First Amendment rights because, “Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy—it is the 
means to hold officials accountable to the people—political speech must prevail against laws that 
would suppress it by design or inadvertence.”25  Without those fundamental protections that are 
laid out in the Bill of Rights, people would lose the most fundamental freedom that the First 
Amendment protects—the freedom of political speech and association. Without protections for 
freedom of speech, political discourse would be disrupted, and democracy in America would be 
threatened.  Citizens engages with these delicate themes, and it is imperative to understand what 
Citizens means for the future of freedom of speech. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Dan Eggen, "Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court's Decision on Campaign Financing 
- Washingtonpost.com," The Washington Post: National, World & D.C. Area News and 
Headlines - Washingtonpost.com, February 17, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html. 
24 Malcolm, "Obama's State of the Union Address: Criticism of the Supreme Court Campaign 
Finance Ruling." 
25 Citizens United v. FEC (Syllabus, 3). 
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Chapter 2: The History of Campaign Finance Reform: Past, Present, and Future 
 
A Brief History 
 Citizens is far from the first important decision regarding campaign finance reform to be 
rendered.  In fact, the history of campaign finance reform can be traced back to the early 
twentieth century. This section will outline the major cases that were instrumental in shaping 
campaign finance reform law. This is crucial to an understanding of where the latest edition to 
campaign finance reform law (Citizens) fits in with the previously established precedent. An 
understanding of many of the controversies that are central to campaign finance regulation can 
be established by investigating the history of legislation in this area. 
Although there is disagreement as to when legislation regulating the amount of money 
that could be donated to political endeavors began, most scholars agree that an early, if not the 
earliest, instance of campaign finance reform was the Tillman Act of 1907.  This early law laid 
the groundwork that would be greatly expanded upon in later cases.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
the Tillman Act banned corporations from contributing to campaigns in any manner.26  This is 
the reason that most consider it to be the beginning of campaign finance reform.   
However, Senator Jeff Sessions from Alabama claims that the Tillman Act “did not bar 
independent political speech funded by labor unions or corporations” so it should not be 
considered the beginning of finance reform history.27 This paper responds by noting that the link 
between monetary donations and political speech has been well established in the law.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Adam Winkler, "The Corporation in Election Law," The Loyola Law Review, 1998, 1246. 
27 Sessions, Jeff. "Opening Statement of Hon. Patrick Leahy, A US Senator from the State of 
Vermont." In Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One 
Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session: "We the People"? Corporate Spending in 
American Elections after Citizens United. Serial No. J-111-79. March 10, 2010. 4. 
13	  
Campaign financing is tantamount to political speech for two reasons.  The first is that there is an 
inherent symbolic value in contributing to a campaign.28  Regardless of the amount of money 
that is being donated, the act of contributing to a campaign is representative of an individual’s 
interest in supporting that candidate.  If the contribution was $20 or $2,000, the symbolic value is 
still the same: spending money demonstrates support.  The second is that money is integral to 
running a successful campaign.  With President Obama spending $750 million on his campaign, 
and rumored estimates predict he will spend $1 billion on a reelection bid, the actual monetary 
aspect of campaigns cannot be ignored.  
With the sharply increasing amount of money being spent in elections recently, the stakes 
for a post-Citizens world are large.  The further regulation of direct campaign contributions, as 
was the case from Buckley through BCRA, support the incumbent candidate.29  In essence, 
members of Congress pass legislation that will support their future re-election bids.  By limiting 
the size of campaign contributions, challengers are required to collect multiple smaller 
contributions, which may be more difficult without the previously established public support and 
recognition that incumbents have.  With this advantage, average incumbent direct spending as 
compared to challenger spending, for races for the House, has increased from 1.5-to-1 to 4-to-
1.30   However, “most studies do not find that incumbents’ expenditures have a significant effect 
on the number of votes incumbents receive.”31  Note that this is for independent expenditures by 
the incumbent, not contributions or expenditures by third parties.  However, if campaign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Rick Hasen, "Beyond Citizens United: Campaign Finance Law and the Roberts Court."  
29 Bradley A. Smith, "The Myth of Campaign Finance Reform," in Hearing before the 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second 
Session: "We the People"? Corporate Spending in American Elections after Citizens United, 
Serial No. J-111-79 (National Affairs, 2009), 192. 
30 Smith, 192 
31 Stratmann, Thomas. "What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of 
Money and Votes." Southern Economic Journal 57, no. 3 (January 1991): 606. 
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expenditures had an effect on the outcome of a campaign, the potential exists for politicians to 
endorse the preferred policy of the person (or corporation, for Citizens) who made the 
expenditure.32  As the data indicate, “campaign finance regulations essentially require that 
candidates fill their coffers in small increments, the law clearly advantages incumbents.”33  In 
summary, regulation on contributions benefits incumbents while independent expenditures have 
proven to not have a statistically significant effect upon election for incumbents or challengers.  
Therefore, since Citizens upheld previous contribution limits but changed expenditure limits, and 
in accordance with the above data, this paper finds that there will be little to no effect on 
candidate elections.  However, there has not been a general federal election since Citizens was 
passed; corporations could drastically change their expenditure behavior. 
 While there is a minimal degree of controversy over the validity of the Tillman Act as 
campaign finance reform’s basis, this paper is satisfied with the evidence that supports the 
legitimacy of Tillman. The next important event was the development of the Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1925.34  This Act was meant to tighten loopholes that were being exploited in 
Tillman.  Next was the Smith-Connally Act (1943), which specifically addressed the issue of the 
potential influence of labor unions.35  Citizens was not the first case to recognize the importance 
that unions can have in elections.  Smith-Connally forbade labor unions from directly 
contributing to candidates; at this point, labor unions and corporations had essentially the same 
restrictions placed on them.36   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Stratmann, 606. 
33 Smith, 192 
34 Smith, 190. 
35 Gerard D. Reilly, "The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act," George Washington Law 
Review 285 (1960): 285. 
36 Ibid. 
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 Up until this point, the accepted understanding is that these acts were enforced weakly, 
and were consequently limited in efficacy.  In addition to these claims, and partially due to 
Watergate, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).  FECA was amended 
in 1974, and set limits for PAC contributions to candidates at $5,000 per candidate per election 
cycle.37  As FECA has been amended several times, the current limit that individuals have for 
campaign contributions is $2400 per candidate per election.  In reality, the $2400 limit can be 
extended to $4800, as an individual can sponsor a candidate in both the primary and the general 
election. FECA was critical in codifying the laws that govern campaign finance reform.   
  
Buckley v. Valeo and Expenditure Limits 
Buckely v. Valeo is perhaps the most important Supreme Court case to consider in this 
analysis. Much of the majority opinion’s rationale for overturning the lower district courts’ 
rulings on Citizens is on the basis that Buckley was unconstitutional.  The difference between 
contributions and expenditures was key in Buckley.  To review, direct campaign contributions 
are those that go to the candidate, for later use as the candidate sees fit.  Expenditures are 
independent of the party or the candidate, and reflect the viewpoints of the individual (or 
corporation, as Citizens later decided) that are responsible for them.  Buckley determined that 
expenditures are considered to be speech while contributions are considered only to be 
associations.38  For this reason, the Buckley Court determined that it was unconstitutional to set 
limitations on expenditures, which were considered to be legitimate forms of speech.  Since 
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contributions are only associations, and not actual speech, the Court left those in place.  
Although modifications have occurred over time, the same principle has remained intact. 
 One defense of the Buckley decision says, “There is nothing invidious, improper, or 
unhealthy in permitting such funds to be spent to carry the candidate’s message to the 
electorate…not the government but the people…who must retain control over the quantity and 
range of debate on public issues in a political campaign.”39  This quote highlights the reason that 
the Court banned expenditure limits, but retained contribution limits.  In addition to emphasizing 
this point, this defense of Buckley also brings up the issue that individual citizens are integral in 
the decision-making process for democracies.  According to this argument, and to the majority 
opinion in Citizens, it is unacceptable to limit expenditures, which are tantamount to political 
speech.  Furthermore, the term expenditure was now applied only to a form of express advocacy, 
or electioneering communications, as was the terminology used in Citizens.40 
 Questions as to the function of corruption once expenditure limits were lifted arose 
during the Buckely era.  However, the Court found that there was no direct evidence that money 
spent in politics was a causal factor for corruption.41  This claim will be discussed in detail later 
in this section with reference to the recent case Caperton v. Massey.   
The biggest impact of Buckley was that the Court invalidated limitations for candidates’ 
expenditures of personal funds for their own campaigns.42 This holding was meant to validate the 
fundamental right of removing any barriers for the individual to participate in politics, but over 
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time, this holding was expanded.43  In the status quo, expenditures from third party individuals, 
and now corporations, that wish to spend on campaigns are protected. To some observers, the 
original interpretation of Buckley, which allows for unlimited personal spending, may be of more 
contemporary relevance. The amount of money that has infiltrated politics has been steadily 
rising for some time.  For example, the total cost of presidential races in 2000 was $650 million, 
in 2004 it was $1 billion, and in 2008 it was $1.8 billion.44  Moreover, in federal races overall, 
there has been about a 75% increase in the amount of money spent recently.45  Campaigns are 
becoming more expensive, and unlimited opportunity for corporations to spend may only add to 
this problem.   
It is also helpful to consider the breakdown of where this massive amount of money is 
coming from.  As data from the 2008 election reveals, $799 million, or 56% of the total receipts 
were contributions from individuals. $380 million, or 26.8% of the total receipts was from 
expenditures from PACs.  Candidates provided $36 million, or 2.5%, and the rest of the money 
was from the respective political parties.46  The data comes as a surprise when reflecting upon 
Buckley.  Buckley invalidated expenditure limits and upheld contribution limits, yet individual 
contributions make up the majority of campaign financing. This influential case created the 
policy that has been debated for thirty years, yet it seems as if the behavior of individual 
American citizens has not been as troubled by the standards that were set in Buckley. 
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Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) 
 Austin built upon the foundation of campaign finance reform that was established in 
Tillman and Buckley, and proved to be an extension of these policies with a few key 
modifications. This case sought to determine whether the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, 
which banned corporations from using general treasury funds in campaigns for elections, was 
constitutional or not.47  The issue of constitutionality was rooted in the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that banning the use of corporate general 
treasury funds does not represent a violation of either freedom of speech arguments from the 
First Amendment or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Stevens, 
who wrote for the majority, noted that Austin was perfectly aligned with Buckley’s separation 
and distinction between expenditure and campaign limits. He said, “In my opinion the distinction 
between individual expenditures and individual contributions that the Court identified in Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 45-47 (1976), should have little, if any, weight in reviewing corporate 
participation in candidate elections.”48  According to the decision, Austin aligns with Buckley, 
and the ban on expenditure limits remains constitutional.  In fact, Justice Stevens seems to be 
pointing out that the issue is not actually one of constitutionality; Stevens highlights the 
importance of determining a unified stance on corporate personhood over individual types of 
donations.   
 Secondly, Austin is remembered for citing an attempt to protect from the distorting 
effects that enormous wealth can have on politics.  The Court, in its often quoted opinion, said, 
“Michigan’s regulation…aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the 
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corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the 
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the 
corporation's political ideas.”49  With this decision, the Court recognized that it is acceptable to 
place limits on campaign financing in order to prevent either actual corruption or the appearance 
of corruption.  Austin recognizes the potentially distorting power of money in politics.  It is 
crucial to keep this fact in mind when this chapter later discusses the Caperton v. Massey case. 
Finally, Austin is noted for declaring, “Political speech may be banned based on the 
speaker’s corporate identity.”50  As this quote reflects, the identity of the speaker is a key issue in 
determining the validity of the Citizens decision.  Identity politics is a complex discipline in its 
own right; this paper will not attempt to conduct a complete analysis of identity politics in order 
to signify the importance of Austin.  However, the identity issues that were raised in Austin 
transcend the boundaries of solely this case.  While identity issues remain relevant in Citizens 
and further decisions on campaign finance reform, Austin was effectively overruled in Citizens.  
A leveling of the playing field, as Austin attempted to achieve, in order to facilitate equality of 
political speech for all, was considered to be unconstitutional by the Roberts Court.51 
Citizens overruled the precedent set in Austin. The opinion of the Court claimed that the 
Austin was “hotly contested” and decided in a manner that was unbefitting for the Court.52  The 
arguments that surround the “anti-distortion rationale” in Austin will be discussed in Chapter 5; 
nevertheless, Austin is a crucial case in the history of campaign finance reform.   
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McCain-Feingold Act and Beyond 
 Since the Austin decision, a series of cases have been adjudicated on the subject of 
campaign finance reform. Chronologically, the next important topic of discussion is the McCain-
Feingold Act of 2002, which is also known as the Bi-Partisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).  
BCRA cut out much of the “soft money” in politics that Buckley allowed for, and also closed 
several of the other loopholes that were exploited since Buckley’s inception.53  Fundamentally, 
BCRA was responsible for creating the specific set of parameters that led to the prohibition of 
Citizens United’s Hillary: The Movie.  To review, Citizens came about because it aired a 
documentary that violated several components of BCRA.  The movie was publicly distributed (it 
was available to viewers “on demand” on cable television), it aired within 30 days of the primary 
election, and it was considered to be an electioneering communication (the film could not be 
interpreted by a reasonable person in any other way but as a message to vote against Hillary 
Clinton).  Rick Hasen has suggested that the (mostly) non-profit organization Citizens United 
specifically designed the circumstances surrounding the release of Hillary to present a challenge 
to the Supreme Court, with the eventual goal of changing legislation in mind.54 
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 McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) is notable for upholding key aspects 
of BCRA.55  Aspects of BCRA were controversial and questionable to some, therefore 
McConnell emerged as a chance to reaffirm the principles that were established in BCRA.  
Additionally, McConnell relied heavily on the precedent that was established in Austin.  Because 
the majority in Citizens claimed that Austin was “hotly contested” any precedent that was 
established in Austin was effectively erased.56  Since McConnell primarily was based on the 
precedent that was set in Austin, and Austin was deemed to be unconstitutional, McConnell lost a 
significant degree of legitimacy.   
 In 2006, the case Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL) v. Federal Election Commission 
reached the Supreme Court as an as-applied challenge to a particular section of BCRA.   The 
substance of the challenge is minor and irrelevant to the bigger picture.  However, this as-applied 
challenge represents an earlier version of the type of challenge that Citizens United raised.  
WRTL began to chip away at fundamental aspects of BCRA, and laid the groundwork for the 
legislative overhaul that was soon to occur. 
 There has also been controversy regarding the recent finance-related case, Caperton v. 
Massey.  In another 5-4 decision in 2009, the Supreme Court ruled that Judge Benjamin Brent 
must recuse himself from a case in which he had a conflict of interests.57  The opinion was: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 "House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties, Committee on the Judiciary," in Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, 
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 
One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session: First Amendment and Campaign Finance 
Reform After Citizens United, Serial No. 111-71 (February 3, 2010), 2. 
56 Citizens United v. FEC (Kennedy, A., opinion, 1). 57	  "Caperton v. Massey." Brennan Center for Justice. August 6, 2009. 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/caperton_v_massey/.	  
22	  
We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias - based on objective and reasonable 
perceptions - when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant 
and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or 
directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.  The 
inquiry centers on the contribution's relative size in comparison to the total amount of 
money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the 
apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election58 
 
This “risk of actual bias” is in reference to the $3 million dollars that a CEO of a coal company 
spent upon the re-election bid of Judge Benjamin Brent to the West Virginia Supreme Court.  
Essentially, the Court ruled that money in politics has the potential to corrupt.59 
 While this statement would be completely aligned with decisions such as Austin and 
BCRA, Caperton stands out in direct contrast to Citizens.  The majority in Citizens lifted the ban 
on corporate expenditures with the rationale that no evidence has been found as to the corruptive 
powers of money.  In Caperton, the same Court decided that money does have the power to 
corrupt, or else the judge would not have been required to recuse himself.60     
 When analyzing the history of campaign finance reform within the Supreme Court, there 
appears to be a fundamental inconsistency regarding the necessary burden of proof for 
contributions and expenditures.  For contributions, it seems as though the Court needs almost no 
evidence of corruptive powers to maintain limits on contributions; the Court is protective and has 
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a broadly applied principle in this case.61  However, for expenditure limits, the Court has even 
ruled once before (Caperton) that expenditures can have the ability to corrupt politicians, yet the 
Court allowed for, potentially, billions of dollars to enter into the upcoming campaigns.  These 
two standards are at odds with each other.  This brief history of campaign finance reform 
legislation was meant to provide a clear context with which to understand Citizens on a deeper 
level.  However, after examining the most important cases in this area, a cogent position on the 
trajectory of campaign finance reform has still not been developed.     
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Chapter 3: Stare Decisis, Judicial Review, and Judicial Activism 
 
Introduction 
 Based on all of the controversy that Citizens has caused, it may seem preposterous to 
consider that there is a strong consideration that this case should never have been presented to 
the Supreme Court in the fashion that it was.  This Chapter seeks to examine the ways in which 
Citizens was argued to change its focus from an as-applied challenge to a facial challenge.  
Moreover, this Chapter will also include an analysis of several of the Justices’ opinions.  Finally, 
this chapter will briefly examine the disclosure agreement of the ruling, which was only opposed 
by Justice Thomas. This Chapter primarily aims to decide whether the Citizens case should have 
ever been heard.  This is an extremely important consideration, because if the case should never 
have been reviewed by the Supreme Court in the sweeping manner that it was, then this ruling 
should have no validity.  However, it is crucial that, occasionally, action must be taken outside of 
the normative framework to create necessary change.  Cases such as Brown v. Board of 
Education, Roe v. Wade, and Baker v. Carr represent rulings that differed significantly from the 
previously established precedent.  For example, Brown did not solely rely on judicial precedent, 
but instead integrated additional, relevant factors to create a decision that changed the course of 
American history.62    
 One of the central concepts upon which the American legal system rests is that of stare 
decisis.  This phrase comes from the Latin and means, “To stand by that which has been 
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decided.”63  When applied in the courtroom, stare decisis dictates that judges should use the 
precedent of preceding legal cases as a detailed guideline for how to decide current cases.  
Logically, for a successful legal tradition to follow from this principle, sound judgment is 
required for all preceding cases. This issue is crucial in the Citizens case, because both the 
majority opinion and the dissenting opinion argue that previous Supreme Court decisions have 
been incorrect for a few relevant cases.   
The majority opinion argues that Austin was not well reasoned and should be overruled.64  
Chief Justice Roberts remarked on the issue, “When the precedent’s validity is so hotly contested 
that it cannot reliably function as a basis for decision in future cases…the simple fact that one of 
our decisions remains controversial does undermine the precedent’s ability to contribute to the 
stable and orderly development of the law.”65 
 The Chief Justice was referring to the Austin case in this quote, and he highlights the 
inability of the Supreme Court to rely on decisions that the Roberts Court considers to be 
misaligned with the Constitution.  Justice Roberts cites the level of controversy that surrounded 
the Austin decision to be a valid reason to disregard its holding.  However, the same rationale 
could easily be applied to Justice Roberts’ ruling on Citizens. Citizens is a controversial decision 
too—arguably creating more controversy than the Austin decision did.  If we believe the logic 
behind Justice Roberts’ argument that invalidates Austin, then Citizens must also be invalidated 
due to its high level of controversy.  The majority’s attempt to ignore stare decisis with regard to 
Austin is too hypocritical to be valid.   
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 Another criticism of the majority’s sweeping decision in Citizens is that manifold other 
alternatives exist that would have corrected the violation that brought Citizens United to trial in 
the first place.  Essentially, the level of unconstitutionality that Citizens United was responsible 
for could have been easily fixed without a legislative overhaul.66  According to the dissent, there 
were some changes that Citizens United could have made to fix its violations of the Constitution 
at a minimal cost.  For example, Citizens United could have restructured the funding of the 
movie so that only its PAC was using its funds to finance Hillary, not the funds of the general 
treasury.  Another option would have been for Citizens United to distribute privately the film, 
instead of making it publicly available with the “on demand” function for television.67  There are 
other hypothetical scenarios where Citizens United could have made simple alterations to avoid 
breaking the law, but these other options are not necessary to explain.  This analysis finds that 
there were easily applicable changes that Citizens United could have chosen to apply to Hillary 
to make the documentary constitutional.  However, Citizens, did, indeed, make it to the Supreme 
Court, so it is worthwhile to examine the balance of judicial activism, judicial restraint, and stare 
decisis that were involved in this divisive case.     
The terms “judicial activism” and “judicial restraint” are both frequently used when 
trying to decipher the motive behind a justice’s decision.  While one can find several differing 
definitions for judicial activism, a fairly moderate one may read that judicial activism occurs 
when a judge lets personal biases or other extraneous factors take precedence over precedent in 
trials.  For this reason, assignment of the term judicial activism must be taken seriously.  	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Opponents of the decision, however, appear to have no problem with categorizing the majority 
justices as guilty of judicial activism.  For instance, one claim reports that, “The justices 
answered a question they weren’t asked in order to overturn a century of precedent which they 
had reaffirmed only recently. The only real change has been one of Court membership.”68  An 
interesting part of this remark is the final sentence, where Chairman of the Subcommittee Jerrod 
asserts that the only reasons that the Citizens ruling turned out the way it did is because of the 
Bush-era appointments to the Court.69  It is difficult to validate or invalidate this biting 
accusation in tangible proof; Chapter 4 will include an in-depth examination of the recent history 
of the Court, which will be helpful to determine if personal bias was the cause of any degree of 
judicial activism.     
Nevertheless, in the literature surveying the Citizens case, the claim that the justices who 
voted for the majority opinion unnecessarily overturned decades of law frequently appears.  
Although, as mentioned previously, relying on extra-precedent factors may be acceptable in 
certain circumstances, the century of precedent that has been overturned, as discussed in Chapter 
2, refers to the earliest beginning of campaign finance reform with the Tillman Act of 1907.70  
The debate as to whether campaign finance reform began at this moment in history is less 
relevant than the debate over whether the Court should have heard the case at all.  Justice 
Stevens authored the most thorough dissenting opinion, and his criticism that several of the 
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Justices practiced judicial activism, especially when juxtaposed with remarks from judicial 
confirmation hearings, is necessary to discuss.    
Based on their comments during previous cases and their confirmation hearings, most of 
the Justices who voted on this case were considered to be minimalists.  This means that the 
Justices are following “a distinctive form of judicial decision-making by which a court settles the 
case before it, but leaves many things undecided.”71 Further, judicial minimalism advocates a 
policy where justices do not seek to change drastically the law when there is not ample precedent 
to do so.  This policy emphasizes judicial restraint, as opposed to the contrasting policy of 
judicial activism.   
While the terms “activism” and “restraint” (“minimalism”) may appear to be of a neutral 
connotation, in practicality one term frequently has negative undertones.  If a justice is accused 
of being an activist, this is normally viewed as an accusation or an insult.72  Scholars point to 
historical tradition as a possible origination for the current perception that classification as an 
activist judge is received negatively.  The power of judicial review, as accorded to the Supreme 
Court in Marbury v. Madison, was originally intended to give the weak judiciary branch a 
relative degree of power. In fact, in Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78, he labels the 
Supreme Court and the judiciary as “the least dangerous branch.”73  Therefore, at the time of the 
founding of the United States of America, the judiciary was accorded powers to make it as 
relevant as the legislature and the executive branches.  However, as time has progressed, judicial 
review proved to be a powerful policy that had far-reaching impacts.  
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Understanding how the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution to apply to law is 
essential to gaining an accurate perspective on the merits of judicial activism and restraint.  
There are two different schools of thought when it comes to interpretation of the law: one that 
determines cases individually and one that utilizes a principled, general approach.  Sunstein is a 
scholar that believes in the case-by-case basis approach.  His main argument is that a generalized 
approach is not specific enough to engage with the multiple and varied circumstances of each 
case.74  For example, Sunstein remarks that broadly based rules can often lead to ambiguities, 
over-inclusiveness, and under-inclusiveness.75  Interestingly, both sides of the Citizens opinion 
base the legitimacy of their opinions on principles similar, if not identical, to the ones discussed 
immediately above.  Sunstein makes the argument that analyzing each case with regards to its 
own circumstances is the best way to ensure fairness and sustainability of a legitimate 
judiciary.76 
Conversely, Justice Scalia espouses that the decisions for cases should rely on well-
established generalized principles, not decided on a case-by-case basis.  In his article for the 
University of Chicago Law Review, Scalia points to ease and predictability as two crucial 
reasons why the judiciary must support a policy of adhering to generalized rules.77  On ease, 
perhaps facility for members of the public and the judiciary is not the critical component that 
should be upheld over most others.  Ease would be appreciated, but Scalia’s argument that a 
government must use well-established general principles to ensure the legitimacy of the state is 
more convincing. He argues: 	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As laws have become more numerous, and as people have become increasingly ready to 
punish their adversaries in the courts, we can less and less afford protracted uncertainty 
regarding what the law may mean.  Predictability, or as Llewellyn put it, "reckonability," 
is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name.  There are times when even a 
bad rule is better than no rule at all.78 
 
Regardless of whether the Justices endorse an individualistic or a generalized approach, the 
president appoints these individuals for the purpose of interpreting the Constitution.  If a Justice 
is accused of being an activist judge, it is normally indicative of a Justice acting upon his or her 
own inclinations as opposed to serving strictly as a custodian of the Constitution. Many opinions 
consider the Justices who sided with the majority to be activists because the Citizens ruling 
created new and important additions to the legal framework.  Since the decision reversed 
preexisting law in order to align with the Constitution, there was a necessary change to the law.  
Moreover, the dubious circumstances surrounding the manner in which the case was ultimately 
presented to the Supreme Court has been the source of these activist accusations. 
 The activism with regard to bringing the case before the Supreme Court may be the most 
important argument in deciding if the Citizens decision was correct. If such a high level of 
activism, one which is not within the scope of duties or power of the Supreme Court, was 
necessary to even hear Citizens, then it is possible that the case should never have been discussed 
at all.79  If the Court would never have heard the case without an extreme “bending of the rules” 
by a few justices, then any substantive ruling that emerged from the case would be irrelevant and 	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non-binding.  However, freedom for political discourse is so fundamentally important to the 
successful functioning of a democracy that perhaps the Court’s request for re-argumentation, and 
subsequent sweeping reform was warranted to protect this freedom. 
Moreover, there are questions as to whether Chief Justice Roberts’ decision in hearing 
Citizens is consistent with his remarks at his confirmation hearing.  During this confirmation 
hearing, Roberts endorsed a minimalist and non-activist policy, where he even said that he had 
“no agenda” and would keep an “open mind.”80  In accordance with questioning Roberts’ 
ideological cohesion, there are also intimations that Justices serving on the Roberts Court may be 
showing bias in favor of big business.  For example, the Supreme Court takes on less than two 
percent of the petitions that it receives per year.  Yet 26% of the Chamber of Commerce’s 
petitions were accepted.81  The Roberts Court has heard 46 business cases in which the Chamber 
of Commerce has been a party, and 75% of these cases were decided in favor of the Chamber of 
Commerce.82  These figures seem to represent a significant departure for the averages of the 
Court.  While this is not enough evidence to prove corruption in the current Supreme Court, 
these statistics raise important questions.  The most important of which may be: will this 
apparent slant toward favoring big business, especially in light of the Citizens case, ultimately 
mar the reputation of the Roberts Court enough to undermine the legitimacy of the decisions that 
the Roberts Court has made or will make in the future?  While we can only make predictions as 
to how future scholars and the public will view the set of decisions, specifically those regarding 
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campaign finance reform, that emerge from the Court, the risk of judicial illegitimacy is a cause 
for concern. 
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Chapter 4: Corporations 
 
A Brief History 
As John Marshall, the longest serving Chief Justice in the history of the United States 
Supreme Court, said, “A corporation is an artificial being…the mere creature of law, it possesses 
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it.”83 This statement, made in 
1819, incorporates much of the precedent that the Marshall Court created.  This precedent is 
often considered to be the foundation of American law, although, as the following analysis will 
show, there have been substantial changes since the beginning of the nineteenth century.  Since 
the unique nature of the corporation is at the heart of the Citizens case, this chapter will first 
provide a brief legal history of corporations in the United States and then will engage with three 
crucial arguments about aspects of corporations.  After this chapter, a more detailed 
understanding of the position of the majority and the dissenting opinion regarding corporations 
will be obtained. 
 One significant case to discuss is Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company 118 
U.S. 394 (1886).  This case is interesting, in that the precedent that it (unintentionally) created 
has been far more influential and important than the decision of the actual case.  Basically, the 
state of California was attempting to add on taxation of areas in between the fence and the 
railroad tracks.  The Southern Pacific Railroad Company cited a previous contract that would 
make this new agreement contradictory.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court unanimously decided 
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that the fenced area was not legally taxable.84 However, the important point, for the purposes of 
this paper, is evident in the headnote of the case (a short summary of the crucial issues in the 
case).  Official Court Reporter J.C. Bancroft Davis reported that Chief Justice Waite said, “The 
court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the 
opinion that it does.”85  This acknowledgment that the Court accords the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to corporations was not of notable significance in 1886, but has 
since become important.  Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company represents the first 
written legal classification that corporations have equal protection under the law under the 
Constitution.86   
 This case created the basis for, and oftentimes the confusion with, corporations being 
accorded the same constitutional rights as individuals.  This paper seeks to answer a few of these 
crucial questions. For instance, understanding the exact definition and rights of corporations in 
the pre-Citizens world and the post-Citizens world is essential in grasping an understanding of 
the direction that campaign finance reform is progressing.  
  
Shareholders in a Corporation 
 The first issue of contention between the majority and the dissent, with regard to 
corporations, engages with the delicate issue of the rights of shareholders in a corporation. As 
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was noted above from the Santa Clara case, corporations have been recognized, by legal 
definition, as an artificial creation.  This classification, however, has come into conflict with 
precedent set by cases such as Santa Clara.  An argument that members of the majority opinion 
make is that it is unfair for the shareholders of a corporation to be barred from using their money 
as a form of political expression.  This statement relies upon two assumptions.  First, that giving, 
or earmarking, money for a political campaign is considered an expression of political speech 
and, second, that an individual person’s rights transfer through his business relationships.  To 
reiterate, as was discussed previously, the Supreme Court has found that independent 
expenditures for campaigns are considered to be a form of political speech; therefore it is 
established that independent expenditures are a form of political speech.   
The second question is more intriguing, because there is evidence to support both sides of 
the argument.  A scholar noted that corporations “have long been recognized as able to assert 
constitutional rights where doing so is necessary to preserve the rights of the corporate members 
or shareholders.”87  Therefore, when corporations speak (as speech has already been determined 
as equivalent to indirect expenditures), it is the individual members of the corporation expressing 
their right to associate and claiming their constitutional rights.  Corporations have been legally 
recognized as a viable amalgamation of its shareholders’ rights and must be allowed to protect 
those rights, yet, the controversy over this issue stems from the point at which corporations are 
allowed to carry out its shareholders’ will.88 
 The official Court syllabus, however, finds that, “It is irrelevant for First Amendment 
purposes that corporate funds may ‘have little or no correlation to the public support for the 
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corporation’s political ideas.’”89  Following this logic, even if the political views supported by 
the corporation are not shared by all of its shareholders, the corporation still has the right to 
express its political ideals.  According to the majority, even if the views of shareholders are not 
completely aligned with the view that the corporation has espoused, which would represent the 
toughest challenge to this “shareholder argument,” the corporation may function much like a 
wealthy individual would and choose to spend it money as an exercise in political speech.  
Dissenting opinion on this topic points out that a wealthy individual spending his or her own 
money differs from a corporation spending its shareholders money in elections in that the 
individual is one person with one ideology, whereas the corporation represents the amalgamation 
of thousands of viewpoints. 
 Another argument involving shareholders focuses less on the money that shareholders are 
contributing to political campaigns and more on the role that shareholders serve in a corporation. 
The majority opinion logic for respecting the rights of shareholders to express freedom of speech 
and expression relies primarily upon the assumption that shareholders control the behavior of the 
corporations.  This is true, to an extent—shareholders can buy and sell stock, which is an implicit 
approval or disapproval of the actions that a company is taking. If a shareholder does not 
approve of business decisions that his or her corporation is making, he or she will sell any owned 
stock.90  According to this rationale, if political speech for corporations were to be censored or 
banned, as it was in the pre-Citizens world, this would directly translate to a restriction on the 
rights of individual shareholders.91  Individuals control the corporation, so limiting campaign 
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contributions from the corporation would, in fact, be limiting campaign contributions from the 
individual.   
 The dissenting opinion could have a distinct response to this critique.  The answer, which 
was prominent in the written dissenting opinion of the Court, asks in what scenario shareholders 
actually have a say in the everyday business of multi-million or multi-billion dollar 
corporations?92 It is naïve to think that an average American who may own a few shares of stock 
in a multi-billion dollar corporation can affect the political viewpoint of that corporation. If 
Average Joe sells his handful of stock in disapproval that the corporation has recently donated to 
a candidate that Joe does not agree with, will Joe’s stock sale make the corporation revoke its 
financial support for that candidate? With almost absolute certainty, it will not.  Notably, if this 
effect were to happen millions of times over, then perhaps the corporation would take notice, but 
there is a lack of evidence to go any further into this hypothetical scenario. There are additional 
questions as to if it is Congress’ role to dictate the day-to-day interactions between a shareholder 
and the corporation.   
 Is a corporation a person? This is a fundamental question to determine the appropriate 
distribution of rights.  Perpetuity of life and limited liability are also aspects that are unique to 
corporations.93  It seems that the majority is aligning with the Santa Clara ruling, which states 
that corporations and people are accorded the same rights under the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The dissent has issued this probing question against claims by the 
majority that corporations are equal enough to people to have full constitutional rights: Should 
corporations be allowed to vote? Since corporations have so many rights that are similar to 	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humans, it seems that the next cogent step would be to allow corporations to run for elected 
office and the right to vote.  Defenders of the majority have responded by saying that 
corporations do not necessarily require the right to vote, but due to their enormous potential for 
influence in American society corporations do deserve protection of political speech.94  
Corporations are inherently included in the political process because of the amount of money that 
they contribute to the government (taxes) and, therefore, society. Discriminating against this 
protection would entail the government actively giving preference to certain viewpoints over 
others. This is antithetical to the values that the Bill of Rights and the First Amendment was 
based upon.    
 The majority opinion also emphasizes that there are numerous corporations that are not 
the stereotyped, multi-million or multi-billion enterprises.  There are a significant amount of 
small and non-profit corporations that do not have the appropriate financial support to maintain a 
PAC.95 As discussed earlier, the PAC is the mechanism that corporations use for donating to 
political campaigns.  Therefore, it is extremely important that the protection of political speech 
be extended and protected for smaller PACs.  The majority argues that in the pre-Citizens world, 
there was a de facto ban on political speech for the smaller corporations that could not afford the 
maintenance of a PAC.96  According corporations the necessary protection of political speech, 
but not going as far as to make corporations eligible to vote or run for office, was a necessary 
measure to protect freedom of speech for all.  
 This paper finds a contradiction in the logic of the majority regarding the necessity for all 
corporations to have protected political speech.  As mentioned above, the reason that 	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corporations require the ability to engage in public dialogue is because of the enormous amount 
of money that they contribute to society.  However, the majority claims that smaller corporations 
also deserve the same level of freedom of expression.  If a corporation is unable to even pay the 
salaries of a small staff for a PAC, then it seems unlikely that that particular corporation would 
be contributing enough money to society to necessitate voicing its opinion in the public 
atmosphere.  Unless the majority wishes to change its rationale for why there exists a right for 
corporations to have protection of political speech, this protection necessarily cannot extend to 
all corporations. Since the reasoning could not protect small corporations without enough 
funding to form a PAC, then there would be no added protection for small PACs; that advantage 
is lost.   
          
What About Unions? 
The Citizens decision does not exclusively apply to corporations, as was mentioned in the 
introductory chapter.  Unions are also included as bodies that are exempt from the normal 
restriction on campaign contributions, and they also preclude people from obtaining certain jobs 
if they refuse to be a part of the union.  This paper has chosen to exclude unions from its 
discussion for a specific reason.  This chapter has been focusing on the subtleties and details of 
corporations, and has been attempting to sift through arguments, through the framework of 
corporations, that either support or reject the decision.  As this next section seeks to prove, 
unions are substantially different from corporations, and thus are not included in this analysis, 
because of one important reason: unions already possess a unique protection mechanism for their 
members. 
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 Typically, a union is composed of many individuals that band and act together.  
Contrastingly, shareholders in corporations, for the most part, do not interact with each other. 
There is also a notable difference in the accountability and transparency structures between 
corporations and unions, where corporations are notorious for acting with little to no 
transparency.97  Not only are the purpose and structure of unions fundamentally different from 
those of corporations, but the law also has precedent for treating these two groups differently.  In 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977), protection for unions and public-sector workers 
against using their dues to finance “political or ideological spending” that the member disagrees 
with was present, but there was not this same protection for shareholders in a corporation before 
Citizens emerged.98   
 At this point, it would make be logical to conclude that unions are insignificant actors for 
the purpose of this paper.  However, there is evidence to support that labor unions are, or at least 
before the Citizens decision, more actively involved in political campaigns than corporations are.  
California has no restrictions on the amount of corporate political advertisements that are 
allowed, yet not a single corporation was one of the top ten independent contributors in 
California political campaigns from 2001 to 2006.99  Who, or what, was filling those ten spots in 
the absence of corporations? Five labor unions, two Indian tribes, two individual people, and the 
trial lawyers’ association.  This information suggests that labor unions are a more powerful force 
to be dealt with than corporations are.  Even though corporations may have more money to 
spend, if corporate desire to spend on campaigns does not exist then unions could have far more 	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impact.  Regardless, since union members have been accorded different rights and since their 
structures are fundamentally different to corporations, this paper will be focusing on the Citizens 
decision with respect to corporations. Even though unions have demonstrated more activity in 
political campaign contributions, perhaps the Citizens decision will spur corporations to become 
more involved.  Implications for the future of campaign finance will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6, but for now we continue with a focus on corporations.  
 
Foreign Ownership of Corporations 
 One worry that has emerged among both scholars and the public has been concern over 
Citizens opening up American politics and influence to foreigners.  Since corporations are able to 
unlimitedly contribute to campaigns, there exists the worry that foreign-owned corporations (or, 
perhaps, corporations that are technically owned by Americans and based in American soil, but 
that are heavily influenced by foreigners) will be able to participate in politics by funding 
candidates that support these corporations’ agendas.  To allay one worry, the law, which has 
remained unchanged since Citizens, explicitly states that foreign nationals cannot contribute 
money in any US election.100  Supporters of the decision point out that Citizens did not amend 
any part of this law.101  Further, the overall ways in which foreigners are allowed to participate in 
American politics in any way was not changed.   As the official FEC regulations state, foreigners 
cannot “direct, dictate, control, or directly or indirectly participate in the decision making process 
of any person, such as a corporation, labor organization, political committee, or political 
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organization with regard to such person’s Federal or non-Federal election-related activities.”102  
The conclusion for the majority is that foreign-owned corporations will not be legally able to 
influence American politics.103  
 Opponents to the majority claim that a subsidiary company could easily be formed to 
allow foreign influence.  All that would be needed to accomplish this goal would be to find a US 
citizen as a legally appointed person in charge of the corporation.  However, there is evidence 
that suggests US-based companies are familiar with creating subsidiaries and setting strict 
boundaries for any foreigners involved.104  This supposed reassurance, however, neglects the 
specific worry about foreign, not US, based companies creating subsidiaries.  The inferred link is 
that if US companies have historically had few problems, then foreign companies are likely to 
follow the same pattern.  Speculation on expected behavior may not be enough to assuage 
concerns in this arena. Further, US subsidiaries of foreign owned corporations were already 
allowed to have expenditures in 28 states before Citizens was enacted.  California had no 
regulation for corporate influence, but New York did; this emphasizes the lack of sudden doom 
that the opposition claims will immediately occur once foreign influence enters politics.105 
 The dissenting opinion could respond by noting that state elections, even those of New 
York and California, are on a thoroughly different scale than a general election would be.  The 
potential for corruption would be greatly amplified with a general election, and the temptation 
for undue corporate influence may be too great to resist. Moreover, regarding the overall attempt 
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of the majority to placate fears about foreign influence in American politics, challengers to 
Citizens express concern over First Amendment protection being extended to foreign nationals.  
Because the Court has decided that the First Amendment provides protections of freedom speech 
for all, regardless of the identity of the speaker, this would necessarily include foreign nationals.  
Perhaps, even, this may include multi-national corporations.106   
Additionally, the Court has changed the previous standard for corruption with Citizens.  
Before the decision, an activity that was creating either the appearance of corruption or actual 
corruption was banned.  Therefore, if a multi-national corporation were thought to be conducting 
shady business and using enormous sums of money to influence politicians, then this corporation 
could be viewed as creating the appearance of corruption and would then be completely barred 
from financially contributing to campaigns.  However, with the changes made in Citizens require 
actual, tangible evidence that corruption has occurred in order for a change to be made.107  This 
change may make it considerably more difficult to prove that foreign-owned corporations are 
unfairly influencing elections.     
 In recent years, there has been an increase in the awareness of China as a rising global 
power.  In accordance with this increased awareness, Americans also wonder about the economic 
future of America with such a competitive China in existence.  A popular fear that has emerged 
hypothesizes what the future of American politics would be like if China were able to own and 
operate a US-based corporation.108  If this scenario were to occur, the worry is that such a 
corporation would be able to sponsor whichever candidate will support their policy agenda.  And 	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with the wealth of multi-national corporations, the possibility of outcomes is daunting.  Scholars 
and the public worry about the future of democracy and the democratic tradition if foreign-
owned corporations are allowed to spend as much as they wish.   
 A final concern with foreign-ownership of corporations is more technical than anything 
else.  The response of supporters of the majority opinion to fears about US-based, but foreign-
owned corporations, is that a US citizen must be in charge, and that a US citizen must own a 
controlling share of the corporation.  But, what exactly constitutes a controlling share? This 
seemingly simple question can have powerful impacts.  As it were, the definition for a 
controlling ownership share of a corporation is decided on a state-by-state basis.  For example, 
32 states define a controlling interest with a specific percentage, where 31 of those states clarify 
that 20% ownership or more is needed to qualify as a controlling share.109  This lack of a 
codified definition of a controlling share could lead to corporations seeking out bases in US 
states that have the loosest restrictions.  While it is impossible to determine the exact 
consequences of potential foreign-ownership of corporations on the American political process, 
the ambiguity in definition of a controlling ownership is most certainly a cause for concern.     
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Chapter 5: Additional Considerations in Citizens United 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the remaining issues of contention for the Citizens 
decision.  The opinion, concurrence, and dissent, as discussed thus far, have focused on the 
nature of corporations and freedom of speech.  This chapter seeks to integrate two key additional 
issues that are fundamental to Citizens, such as the possibility of banning other forms of 
communication, and the validity of the anti-distortion (equality) rationale present in Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce.  These issues represent crucial factors in determining the 
validity of the Citizens decision. 
 
Book Banning? 
Once a person mentions the phrase “banning books,” the general public becomes worried 
quite quickly.  Indeed, this was exactly what happened with Citizens.  The then-Solicitor General 
Kagan caused more controversy in this issue when she endorsed the authority of the recently 
developed statute in Citizens to regulate the publishing of books.110  With the newly revised law, 
a publishing house could be banned from publishing a book if there was a single sentence in the 
entire book that could be deemed as an electioneering communication.  While many people 
might brush actual book banning off as a distant possibility and an event that is highly unlikely 
to occur, Kagan included, the possibility of the government banning publishing of books may 
become a reality in the status quo.   	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It is plausible to imagine the extension of policies that apply to a movie like Hillary or 
another film that was banned from being shown, The Rights of the People, into the realm of the 
written word. While the possibility of book-banning in America is rather worrisome for most 
Americans, Kagan noted, regarding potential opportunity for banning books as a result of 
Citizens, that “there has never been an enforcement action for books,” yet, in acknowledging the 
possibility of literature censorship, there could be “a good as-applied challenge.”111  In this 
statement, Kagan recognizes the potential for government authority to ban other kinds of media 
communication. Her remark about the “as-applied challenge” refers to the recourse that 
individuals who have their material censored could take up.  As was mentioned in the first 
chapter, an as-applied challenge is only brought up on an individual, case-by-case basis. This 
contrasts with the facial challenge, which challenges a law on the grounds that it would never be 
constitutional to follow that law.  While Kagan notes that there is the potential for as applied 
challenges, this inherently recognizes that individuals will have their material censored before it 
either allowed to be published or made unavailable if it were to be published.  This could lead to 
a significant increase in the amount of material that would make the banned list. 
While the above may convince the public of the imminent future of an Orwellian world, 
there are some practical considerations that temper this fate. First, it important to consider that 
even after Citizens, electioneering communications, in a documentary, a pamphlet, or a book, can 
only be banned within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a general election.  In reality, 
this is a fairly small window, and individuals who want to express their political opinions may be 
well advised to ensure that publications are produced outside of these windows.  It is interesting 
to consider the scope of the limitation on individuals producing electioneering communications.  
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While a 30 or 60-day ban may appear easy enough to work around, at what point would the limit 
be too great? This paper does not attempt to answer this question, but instead poses it as a 
thought experiment.  Finally, the entire expenditure ban that Citizens lifted only applies to 
corporations and unions, so individuals are still welcome to produce material with politically-
based content even within a few days of an election.  Therefore, the amount of material that 
Citizens may ban is reasonably minimal.  
The dissent has elucidated some serious and potential harm that may emerge as a result of 
Citizens.  The public should be concerned if even if a minimal chance exists that books may be 
banned in America.  The dissent has pointed out extreme potential consequences of Citizens, and 
the majority has countered by stating that the cases where censorship may occur would be 
reasonably infrequent.  In concluding, if the potential for harm is great, and the opportunity for 
enforcement is very small, then this paper claims that the risk that Citizens creates far outweighs 
the potential rewards.     
 
Anti-Distortion and Equality Rationales from Austin v. Michigan 
 One of the most frequently cited cases in reference to Citizens is the landmark campaign 
finance reform case of the 1990s Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.  As was discussed 
in Chapter 2, Austin “upheld a direct restriction on the independent expenditure of funds for 
political speech for the first time in history.”112  Notably, this is the majority opinion of the 
Court, which ruled such expenditure limits to be unconstitutional and not founded in precedent.  
Regardless, the Austin decision relied upon what it called an “anti-distortion rationale” in order 
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to justify such a limitation on expenditure limits.  According to the decision, these limits were 
essential not in order to prevent corruption, but in order to ensure equality for all.  Throughout 
this discussion it is important to keep in mind that equality and freedom are two separate, and 
different, objectives.  Here, the decision relies upon an understanding of the First Amendment 
that the identity of the speaker is relevant to protecting his free speech.  More succinctly, as 
Justice Kennedy writes for the Court, “The Court is thus confronted with conflicting lines of 
precedent. A pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s 
corporate identity and a post-Austin line that permits them.”113  Chapter 2 covered the 
implications for campaign finance reform history that emerged as a result of Austin, but this 
section seeks to explore the validity of the anti-distortion rationale with respect to equality of 
freedom of speech. 
 The Court has defined its anti-distortion rationale as preventing “the corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the 
corporate form.”114  Is it within the realm of the Court to make policy to prevent distortion of 
wealth? The majority opinion has a twofold answer to this question. First, that it is unacceptable 
to compromise the values elucidated in the First Amendment to make policy in an attempt to 
correct for distortion of wealth.  This is compounded when the majority sees the First 
Amendment as providing equal protection for freedom of speech, regardless of the identity of the 
speaker.115  A second concern is if the Court should be activist in attempts to prevent the 
distortion of wealth.  Perhaps it is not within the mandate of the Supreme Court to be actively 
creating distinctly new policy; it is a Court of review to assess the constitutionality of pre-
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existing laws.  The branch of law that would be responsible for the redistribution of wealth is 
Congress.    
The majority believed that implications for banning other forms of media forced the 
Court to overturn Austin.  If the public was to follow the law as prescribed in Austin, then a 
newspaper that was owned by a corporation may be censored.  If the newspaper were to publish 
any article that contained an electioneering communication, which seems almost inevitable for a 
source of news, and a corporation owned the paper, then this act would violate Austin.  In theory, 
the paper would have to be temporarily suspended or remove any offending articles. It is difficult 
to imagine entering into an election season without consulting some form of media for news 
about campaigns.  The Internet, news delivered on the television, and talk radio all provide 
excellent coverage of critical issues for millions of Americans.  Additionally, the Constitution 
makes no differentiation between different kinds of media communications, so Internet blogs, 
printed newspaper articles, and pamphlets could all be at risk of censorship.116  Even e-books, 
such as Amazon’s Kindle, could be threatened. Access to create political speech, and its 
concurrent availability to be heard, are necessary to the maintenance of democracy; therefore, as 
the majority asserts in the Court opinion, it would be unconstitutional to have a robust media and 
remain consistent with the Austin decision.117  In response to this critique by the majority, the 
defense has responded that society and law have made special exceptions for media corporations 
in the past.  It is assumed that an extension and continuation of such policies could exist in the 
post-Citizens world.  Interestingly, the majority is relying on the precedent that has previously 
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been set, both by the Court and by social norms, that allows special exemptions for media, but 
will not trust Austin’s precedent regarding the anti-distortion rationale. 
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Chapter 6: Looking to the Future and Final Thoughts 
 
Introduction to the Conclusion 
 One of the main goals of this paper has been to utilize precedent and application of 
cogency in order to determine the validity of Citizens. Although this is a fascinating topic of 
inquiry, for which the results will be discussed later in this chapter, the legitimacy of the decision 
has little to do with the real world consequences that will occur.  This final chapter will first 
determine what effect Citizens will have on corporations, politicians, and campaign finance in 
general.  Second, there will be a synthesis of the consequences for political speech, as the 
majority frequently cited First Amendment grounds as a reason for lifting the ban.  Third, this 
section will look to the legislative consequences for the 24 states that have laws that limit 
corporate spending and contemplate the potential ways for a reversal of the decision. Finally, this 
chapter will consider the conclusions from the above consequences and return to answering the 
original question: did the Court make the correct decision in Citizens? 
  
Corporations, Politicians, and Elections: Who Gains and Who Loses 
 There are three major groups who could be affected by the Citizens decision: 
corporations, politicians, and the general population who is involved in the election cycle.  
Corporations are perhaps the most interesting of the three to consider.  The dominantly proposed 
theory is that enormous corporate wealth will now enter into campaigns and have the potential to 
corrupt individuals. The Court made clear, however, that “independent expenditures, including 
those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”118  
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Perhaps, then, the public should not be overly worried about the influence of money in politics.  
It is difficult to gather empirical evidence regarding the legitimacy of claims of corruption, or the 
appearance of corruption in politics.  However, this lack of evidence should not translate to 
apathy in the public sector.  Will corporations enthusiastically spend in upcoming elections now 
that the previously established ban has been lifted, or will the expenditure levels of corporations 
be unaffected by new opportunity?  By using the case study of California that was presented in 
Chapter 4, we may be able to predict that corporate behavior will not overwhelmingly change. 
California, as a state that did not have restrictions on independent expenditures for corporations 
before Citizens, witnessed the majority of the money in politics as dominated by unions.119 
 There has only been one election since Citizens was enacted, which was the mid-term 
election of 2010.  Therefore, the data available to determine if corporations have greatly 
increased expenditures is limited in availability.  One figure reports that almost $4 billion was 
spent in the 2010 midterm election. If accurate, this represents an increase of more than 30% 
from the amount spent in the last federal midterm election.120  Reliable data, complete with a 
breakdown of where specific sources of money are coming from, are difficult to find.  Therefore, 
this increase in spending may have been caused by a number of different factors.  However, this 
paper finds the circumstances surrounding legislation changes with Citizens and a 30% increase 
in amount of money spent in campaigns to be related, and not purely coincidental.  Yet, perhaps 
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this 30% increase is not too extreme; the cost of presidential races increased by 55% from 2004 
to 2008.121   
 The lack of reliable data also points to another issue of consideration for the future: 
disclosure agreements.  The Citizens decision ruled that disclosure was mandatory by the 
corporation that was producing electioneering communications (in this case Citizens United was 
legally required have a few frames of the documentary that notified the public that it was 
responsible for the project).  Interestingly, all 4 of the dissenting justices even agreed with this 
part of the majority opinion. Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion exclusively on the 
topic of disclosure.  Justice Thomas’ main argument was that the right to anonymity of speech 
must be preserved, at any cost.122  His argument, that anonymity is fundamental to protecting the 
essential right of free speech, will be addressed below. All of the justices, save Thomas, 
recognized that the benefits associated with disclosure far outweigh any potential harm.   
There are two potential harms to consider with disclosure.  The first is disclosure in the 
narrow reading, as endorsed by the Court in Citizens, and the second is disclosure of where 
campaign funds are coming from in the overall election process.  There is less overall 
controversy involved with the disclosure requirements as set in Citizens largely because 
corporations are confident that they can maneuver around actually disclosing.123  There are a 
number of corporations that have billions of dollars and hundreds of lawyers at their disposal that 
could be used to find ways around this disclosure.  For instance, if Citizens United did not want 
its name associated with an anti-Hillary Clinton message, the corporation could use a subsidiary 
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corporation or fund a new one with a non-offensive name, something such as “Americans for 
Impartial Information,” or another name along those lines. Americans for Impartial Information 
would then have its name stamped on Hillary, and the American public would know no better.  
Moreover, even if the corporation disclosed, it seems highly unlikely that the public would know 
which individuals that make up the corporation would be the correct targets of violence, if such a 
path were desired.  In fact, there has been no evidence that disclosure leads to violence.  This 
paper endorses that the public should be more worried about increased attempts at disclosure for 
individuals that contribute to campaigns. 
Opponents of disclosure argue that if names are released as to which corporation, or 
individual, supported which initiative, then those corporations, or people, may be targets of 
violence.  Recently, customers have been boycotting Target and Best Buy in response to these 
corporations’ donations to a group that is making ads on behalf of the gubernatorial campaign of 
Tom Emmer of Wisconsin.124  Target spent $150,000 on behalf of Emmer’s campaign, and the 
public has responded by posting YouTube videos where people are shown returning goods to 
Target and cutting up Target credit cards. The main reason that so many Target customers have 
boycotted is because Emmer opposes same-sex marriages.125  
The experience that a corporation such as Target has gone through could have two 
potential impacts:  it could deter corporations from becoming involved in the political process 
through expenditures or it could encourage corporations to become more crafty to avoid 
disclosure.  The second option has already been discussed, but if the first were to occur there 
could be a completely different end scenario.   Essentially, what if Citizens caused corporations 
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theory of the most frequent worry about Citizens, but it is an interesting concept to explore. 
Thomas Mann believes that the public should be more worried about politicians soliciting and 
harassing corporations for financial involvement in campaigns than worry about big business 
corrupting elected officials.126  If corporations desired to become more involved in political 
campaigns, it seems that their lobbying powers would have been dedicated to that cause.  
However, Mann notes that corporations were not pushing for the type of legislation that emerged 
in Citizens. In fact, there is no evidence to support that corporations were unhappy with the 
status quo for expenditures and contributions.127  As mentioned in Chapter 3, it is possible that 
the Roberts Court had a pro-business agenda, regardless of any tacit or explicit support from big 
business.  Further, during the era of the Roberts Court, there has been a decline in the amount of 
petitions filed in every area except campaign finance.128  In fact, the campaign finance related 
case McComish v. Bennett is slated to be decided during April 2011. McComish is an example of 
one of the several cases regarding campaign financing that have reached the Supreme Court 
during the Roberts era.  There is no way to be certain as to what the future of the Roberts Court 
will look like, but scholars predict that only a constitutional amendment or retirement of a judge 
will change the trajectory of the Court back from de-regulation.129 
Although Citizens did not change legislation on disclosure of corporations for 
expenditures, this issue has become increasingly controversial and relevant since Citizens. 
Democrats are attempting to pass the DISCLOSE Act in the Senate in attempts to temper the 
enormous wealth that could be coming from corporations in the upcoming election.  DISCLOSE, 
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disclose to the public the expenditures that they make.130 Specifically, DISCLOSE aims to 
“Amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to prohibit foreign influence in Federal 
elections, to prohibit government contractors from making expenditures with respect to such 
elections, and to establish additional disclosure requirements with respect to spending in such 
elections, and for other purposes.”131  The issue remains undecided in legislation, but disclosure 
has the potential to impact Americans in multiple facets of their lives. 
One potential consequence is exemplified by the website eightmaps.com.  This site 
allows users to view a geographical map and see the names, occupation, and amount of money 
that people donated in favor of the anti-gay marriage Proposition 8 that passed in California last 
year.132  Again, although evidence has not been proffered as to a link between disclosure and 
violence, the possibilities for websites such as eightmaps.com and fundrace.org (every 
contribution to specific causes can be viewed) to cause problems is imminent.  
Another consequence of Citizens is that public financing of candidates may be effectively 
extinguished.  With corporations being allowed to spend unlimitedly, it is doubtful that 
candidates who choose public financing will be able to compete.  This could have disastrous 
consequences for politicians, as those who would normally opt for public financing now feel as 
though they must solicit corporate sponsors.133 Additionally, this effective extinguishing of 
public financing may only increase the advantage for incumbents.  Although the Court has ruled 
that money does not have a corrupting influence, the public should still worry about desperate 
candidates receiving the necessary hundreds of millions of dollars to be competitive in the 	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upcoming presidential election.  According to one source, post tax corporate profits from 2009 
were $1 trillion, and Fortune 100 companies have combined profits of $605 billion.  Therefore, if 
Fortune 100 companies were to take only 2 percent of their post tax profits and put it toward 
political expenditures, this would double all of the current political spending, even including that 
by PACs.134  Notably, this data may have been manipulated to endorse a certain motive, but even 
if these numbers were grossly exaggerated the consequences could be severe. The amount of 
money currently in politics is enormous, and an increase is only more of a cause for concern.  
 
Freedoms 
 As this analysis has highlighted, the issue of freedom of speech and expression is critical. 
There is hardly another freedom that is more central, or more representative, of the American 
tradition.  Since the contribution of money to an independent political effort has been deemed by 
the Supreme Court to be a legitimate expression of political speech, it is essential that this 
freedom be upheld. However, the majority opinion that corporations must have their political 
speech protected on the same level as individual, living persons, is a stretch.  Fundamentally, no 
matter how much legislation is passed that allows corporations certain protections under the law, 
corporations are still not persons.  They have unlimited lifetime, and therefore cannot vote and 
cannot run for office.  While the efforts of the Justices in the majority to protect First 
Amendment rights are well appreciated, the symbolic and tangible harms that accompany 
unlimited corporate expenditures far outweigh the benefits from protecting quasi-person 
corporations.  Moreover, when considering the degree to which other forms of freedom of speech 	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and expression will necessarily be curtailed, Citizens has created more problems than it has 
solved.  Elena Kagan, as the Solicitor General at the time, claimed that book banning would 
occur only in extreme and rare circumstances because of Citizens, but the potential for such 
banning of fundamental expressions of thought are terrifying.  The United States government has 
recognized that it retains the authority to ban books.135  Admittedly, freedom of speech and 
expression has never been absolute in American society, (hate speech, for example, is banned) 
but this acknowledgment of the existing potential for censorship is alarming. Perhaps we are 
moving toward the Orwellian world that Scalia mentioned in his opinion on Austin.136   
 
Legislation 
 24 states currently have laws that restrict corporate spending in elections.  How long will 
these states be able to retain these laws when they directly conflict with the new law as created 
by Citizens? Some of these laws date back over 100 years.  As of April 2011, 17 of the 24 states 
that have laws in conflict with Citizens have introduced legislation to amend the current laws; 11 
states have passed new laws already.137 This is a critically important aspect of the Citizens 
decision that is sometimes overlooked by the more controversial corruption and book banning 
arguments.  Money affects politics at both the federal and the state level, and forcing nearly half 
of the states in America to overhaul their entrenched campaign finance policies has the potential 
for backlash and resentment.  However, attempts at amending laws to fit Citizens have failed in 	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13 of the 24 states.138  While money in politics is critical at the state and federal level, this 
analysis finds more cause for concern over the multi-billion dollar federal campaigns rather than 
state elections. Regardless, the overhaul of state constitutions to remain consistent with Citizens 
is an issue to watch. 
 
Conclusion 
 After analyzing the history of campaign finance reform, the specific arguments that both 
the majority and the dissent made, the history of legislation with regard to corporations, and the 
potential impacts that stem from this decision, this paper finds that the Supreme Court was 
erroneous in its decision for Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.  When Citizens is 
contextualized in the history of campaign finance reform, it is an outlier from the rest of the 
landmark cases. The Tillman Act, the development and refinement of FECA, Buckley v. Valeo, 
and Austin v. Michigan all recognized the importance of freedom of speech, but also realized the 
practical harms in according corporations more rights than individual, living American citizens. 
Overall, the dissenting opinions were more convincing in their defense of American judicial 
tradition of relying on precedent instead of activism to uphold the Constitution.  The Court’s 
solicitation of a re-argumentation of the case to obtain a completely different and far more broad 
set of issues from which to legislate is wildly unprecedented, and even worthy of considerations 
of disregarding the decision since it was so artificially prompted.  Although it is too early to tell, 
the future of American politics eagerly awaits the consequences of Citizens. 
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